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This article explores how the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted the right
to interpretation under Article 6(3)(e) ECHR—a topic which, despite its significance
for the rule of law and access to justice, has received, to date, very limited scholarly
attention. The key finding is that we are witnessing a ‘cautious evolution’: the Court has
progressively—yet simultaneously cautiously—developed the standards and guarantees
of this right, which is one of the rights of defence under Article 6(3) ECHR and a require-
ment of the fair trial. The analysis focuses, in particular, on (i) how general interpretative
techniques that have been developed by the Strasbourg Court were applied by the Court
in its jurisprudence concerning the said provision; (ii) on the interplay between the overall
fairness of the trial and Article 6(3)(e) ECHR; and (iii) on Article 6(3)(e) ECHR and the
relationship between legal assistance/legal aid and the right to interpretation. In addition,
the article identifies possible areas of further development of this right.
KEY WORDS: fair trial, right to interpretation, rule of law, access to justice, European
Convention on Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights
1. INTRODUCTION
Ensuring fairness in criminal proceedings is a quintessential requirement for legal sys-
tems within the Council of Europe and beyond. Article 6 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR) guarantees the right to a fair trial. The present contribution
focuses on one of the rights of defence under the said provision, namely the right to
an interpreter under Article 6(3)(e) ECHR. It is specified therein that ‘[e]veryone
charged with a criminal offence [should] have the free assistance of an interpreter if
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[they] cannot understand or speak the language used in court’.1 Several reasons can be
provided as to why the right to interpretation merits a separate study. To begin with,
it is an area which has received very limited scholarly attention,2 even when compared
with other guarantees of the criminal trial, such as legal assistance. In addition, the right
to interpretation, being part of the requirements of the fair trial, is a requirement of the
rule of law and access to justice. Moreover, interpretation in criminal proceedings is a
fast-developing field: the principles and guarantees that were initially developed by the
Strasbourg Court in its case-law were then strengthened in the European Union system
of protection; the EU legislation in question influenced, in turn, the approach of the
ECtHR to the interpretation of Article 6(3)(e) ECHR. In addition, the structure of
Article 6 ECHR prompts inevitable questions as to whether and how the guarantees
under its third paragraph (including the right to interpretation, which is the focus of
the present study) are connected to the fairness of the trial under its first paragraph.
It should be clarified that the present contribution is not a comparative study3
between the levels of protection granted by the EU and the Convention (in the EU legal
framework, the key reference point is Directive 2010/64/EU4 and its interpretation
by the Court of Justice of the European Union). Instead, the article seeks to cast
light on the Strasbourg Court’s interpretation of the right to interpretation, with a
view to understanding and assessing the evolution of the standards and guarantees
under this provision, its connection with the fairness of the trial and its link with
the right to legal assistance/legal aid. More specifically, it will be argued that we are
1 Although the present contribution focuses on the ECHR, an identical provision can be found in Article
14(3)(f) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 8(2)(a) of the American
Convention on Human Rights provides for ‘the right of the accused to be assisted without charge by a
translator or interpreter, if [they do] not understand or [do] not speak the language of the tribunal or court’.
Regrettably, none of the aforementioned provisions (including the ECHR) are drafted in gender-inclusive
language. In addition, while there is no explicit right to interpretation in the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has interpreted the right to a fair
trial in a broad way, including the requirements for interpretation (see ‘Principles and Guidelines on the
right to a fair trial and legal assistance in Africa’ (2003)).
2 In particular, the first paragraph of Article 6 ECHR, which applies to both civil rights and obligations and
criminal charges, has been the subject of considerable scholarly work. The same cannot be said about the
guarantees in criminal proceedings under the third paragraph of the same article. Notable contributions
focusing on Article 6 (either on its civil, criminal or both limbs) include the following: Brems, ‘Conflicting
Human Rights: An Exploration in the Context of the Right to a Fair Trial in the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ (2005) 27 Human Rights Quarterly 294; Gamble
and Dias, ‘International Fair Trial Protections in Criminal Trials’ (2008) 20 Sri Lanka Journal of International
Law 25; Summers, Fair Trials: The European Criminal Procedural Tradition and the European Court of Human
Rights (2007); Lemmens, ‘The Right to a Fair Trial and Its Multiple Manifestations’ in Brems and Gerards
(eds), Shaping Rights in the ECHR: The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Determining the Scope
of Human Rights (2014) 294; Goss, Criminal Fair Trial Rights: Article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (2014).
3 See, in this respect, Brannan, ‘Raising the Standard of Language assistance in Criminal Proceedings: From
the Rights under Article 6(3) ECHR to Directive 2010/64/EU’ (2012) 1 Cyprus Human Rights Law Review
128; see also EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), ‘Rights of Suspected and Accused Persons across
the EU: Translation, Interpretation and Information’ (2016), available at: fra.europa.eu/sites/default/file
s/fra_uploads/fra-2016-right-to-information-translation_en.pdf .
4 Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to
interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings [2010] OJ L 280/1. The Directive was adopted in
the context of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of
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witnessing a cautious evolution regarding the standards and guarantees of the right to
interpretation. This means that, consistently with its ‘living instrument’ approach,5
the Court has progressively departed from a strictly textual interpretation of the said
provision. Nevertheless, this approach can also be characterised as cautious, not only
because these steps (regarding the development of the guarantees for defendants)
have been taken gradually, but also because the Court has not, to date, impermissibly
‘stretched’ the meaning of Article 6(3)(e) ECHR beyond its object and purpose. Thus,
the first judgments involving Article 6(3)(e) were informed, inter alia, by Golder;6 more
recent judgments were inspired by developments under EU law, and most notably the
standards and guarantees under Directive 2010/64.
The analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence is based on three (interconnected) lines
of investigation. First, the interpretative techniques employed by the Strasbourg Court
in its general jurisprudence are applied in the field of Article 6(3)(e) ECHR; second,
the connection between Article 6(3)(e) ECHR and the fairness of the proceedings is
explored; and third, and with a view to testing the internal consistency of the standards
afforded by Article 6(3), a comparative assessment of legal assistance and interpretation
is undertaken. Overall, this contribution assesses more favourably than critically the
jurisprudence of the Court.
In this context, the article seeks to contribute to the literature on the scope of
the rights of defence and, more generally, the guarantees of criminal procedure under
Article 6(3) ECHR; the persistent debate on the methods of interpretation of the
Convention employed by the Strasbourg Court; and the interplay between the Con-
vention and EU law as regards certain human rights standards. It also seeks to stress the
significance of the right to interpretation when viewed as a component of the rule of law
and access to justice.
The article proceeds as follows. The next section underlines the significance of the
right to interpretation, most notably as being part of the rule of law and access to
justice. The next (and main) part of this article explores the jurisprudence of the Court
on Article 6(3)(e) on the basis of the aforementioned three lines of enquiry. Beyond
arguing that we are witnessing a cautious evolution, the fourth section identifies areas
of further possible development of the rights of the defendant under the said provision.
The final section concludes.
2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RIGHT TO INTERPRETATION
It has rightly been observed that an unfair trial ‘can be devastating to an individual
defendant—removing their liberty, destroying their reputation, even taking away their
life. But unfair trials are also damaging to entire societies as they are used to undermine
democracy and oppress minorities’.7 The right to interpretation is one of the guarantees
of a fair trial. There is no doubt that in an era of increased mobility within the EU
and Europe (for the purposes of study, work or leisure), there is an increased risk that
5 Tyrer v UK, Application 5856/72, 25 April 1978, para 31. This matter is returned to in subsequent sections
of the article.
6 Golder v the UK, Application 4451/70, 21 February 1975.






/hrlr/advance-article/doi/10.1093/hrlr/ngab027/6457966 by guest on 09 D
ecem
ber 2021
4 • Interpreting the Right to Interpretation under Article 6(3)(e) ECHR
individuals may face criminal proceedings in a country other than their own.8 How,
then, to explain the limited attention that the right to interpretation has received from
constitutional and human rights lawyers?
One explanation might be that much of the discussion on the guarantees under
Article 6(3) ECHR has focused on legal aid and the impact of cuts to legal aid on
access to justice. However, equally worrying are efforts to reduce resources in the
field of interpretation. Another explanation might be that for decades, discussions
were dominated by a state-centric version of the rule of law.9 This discourse implied
that individuals would necessarily seek remedies in their domestic legal order and the
accused person would have access to a court in their home state, where they speak their
mother tongue. Although criminal law used to be a quintessential part of the sovereignty
of states, we are increasingly witnessing the constitutionalisation of EU criminal law10
(which is not to claim, though, that states do not retain significant leeway regarding the
organisation of their criminal justice system). And, of course, linguistic aspects of the
rule of law are not confined to criminal proceedings: the requirements of the rule of
law are not met, for example, when an asylum seeker does not understand in their own
language the applicable legal framework or their rights under the domestic proceedings.
This article argues that the right to interpretation (as well as further guarantees under
Article 6(3) ECHR) is fundamentally connected to two aspects of the rule of law which,
properly understood, are essentially interconnected: access to courts and the fairness
of the proceedings. Although this contribution is confined to the Council of Europe,
it must be acknowledged that the debate on the rule of law has suffered, to date, from
the dominance of Western values.11 If so, sketching what a rule of law of international
(global) relevance might look like becomes an exercise replete with challenges.
Access to courts is meaningless if the accused person cannot understand or partici-
pate in the proceedings. Proponents of both the formal and substantive version12 of the
rule of law list access to courts as one of its elements (or sub-rules).13 If so, the ‘dividing
8 EU Fundamental Rights Agency (n 3) 15.
9 Konstadinides, The Rule of Law in the European Union: The Internal Dimension (2017) 61 et seq.
10 Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law (2012); see also Mitsilegas and
Vavoula ‘European Union Criminal Law’ in Hofmann et al. (eds), Specialized Administrative Law of the
European Union: A Sectoral Treatment (2018) 153.
11 Indeed, claims may be submitted pointing to the imposition of Western values and ideals and lack of
acknowledgment of diversity; see, among others, Brooks, ‘The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and
the “Rule of Law”’ (2003) 101 Michigan Law Review 2275; Peerenboom, ‘The Future of Rule of Law:
Challenges and Prospects for the Field’ (2009) 1 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 5; Tamanaha, On The
Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (2004) 138. In addition, often international organisations are keen to
‘disseminate a rule-of-law paradigm to the world which does not tally with their actions, therefore defaulting
in their own rule-of-law terms’; Konstadinides (n 9) 62. See also Palombella, ‘The Rule of Law beyond the
State: Failures, Promises, and Theory’ (2009) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 442.
12 For further discussion on this distinction, see, among others, Young, ‘The Rule of Law in the United
Kingdom: Formal or Substantive?’ (2004) 6 Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law 259; Craig,
‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework’ (1997) Public Law
467.
13 See, among others, Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’ (2007) 66 Cambridge Law Journal 67 at 77 (the lecture
was then converted into a book with a similar title); Dworkin, ‘What is the Rule of Law?’ (1970) 30 The
Antioch Review 151 at 152; O’Donnell, ‘Why the Rule of Law Matters’ (2004) 15 Journal of Democracy 32;
Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (1979) 217; Waldron, ‘The Rule of Law and the
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line between the formal and the substantive conception of the rule of law can be difficult
to draw, not least because some of the technical elements of the rule of law are regarded
as fundamental rights’.14 Relatedly, Lord Bingham in his account sought to emphasise
the fairness of the adjudicative procedures as a sub-rule that is distinct (but related, of
course) to access to courts.15 In addition, the significance of access to courts for the rule
of law has been duly emphasised by courts themselves.16 Moreover, the Statute of the
Council of Europe underlines the significance of the rule of law;17 the same applies to
the work of the Venice Commission.18
On this basis, access to an interpreter is associated with the rule of law in a dual,
dialectic way: as a human right (in accordance with the substantive version) and as
forming part of the right of access to court and access to justice more generally (in
accordance with the formal and substantive versions). This point will inform the
subsequent analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence and, in particular, the discussion of
how the ECtHR treats the right to interpretation vis-à-vis the overall fairness of the
proceedings.
A complementary justification to look into the right to interpretation is its link
with access to justice.19 As was observed earlier, frequently the discussion on access
to justice centres on legal aid. Commentators admit that ‘financial questions’ do come
into play when determining the extent of states’ obligations under Article 6(3)(c)
ECHR.20 Financial considerations were clearly taken into account in the EU, too, when
determining the extent of interpretation and translation rights.21
10–73 (arguing that the procedural dimension of the rule of law, distinct from its substantive and formal
dimensions, encompasses access to courts and related guarantees, such as fairness and impartiality).
14 Arnull, ‘The Rule of Law in the European Union’ in Arnull and Wincott (eds), Accountability and Legitimacy
in the European Union (2002) 253. These rights include, according to the author, Articles 6, 7 and 13 ECHR.
15 Bingham (n 13) 80. Elaborating on this principle, he touched upon the guarantees of Article 6(3) ECHR,
without explicitly mentioning the right to interpretation.
16 In the UK see, for example, the landmark judgments R (on the application of UNISON) v Lord Chancellor,
[2017] UKSC 51, para 66; R (on the application of Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal
and others [2019] UKSC 22 (on the so-called ‘ouster clauses’). See also the landmark judgment of the
ECtHR in Golder (n 6)—where, on the basis of the reference to the rule of law in the preamble to the
Convention, the Strasbourg Court was able to deduce a right of access to court from the text of Article
6(1) ECHR. More generally, Golder was an emblematic case that signified a new, more dynamic, chapter in
the ECtHR’s history; see Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights: From its Inception
to the Creation of a Permanent Court of Human Rights (2010) ch 7. More recently, and in the context of the
rule of law crisis in Poland, the Court found a violation of the right of access to court in Broda et Bojara v
Poland, Applications 26,691 and 27,367/18, 29 June 2021.
17 The Statute can be accessed at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list?module=treaty-detai
l&treatynum=001.
18 See, among others, Venice Commission, ‘Report on the rule of law’ (2011) CDL-ad(2011)003rev, p. 10,
where it was underlined that one of the ‘necessary elements’ of the rule of law is ‘[a]ccess to justice before
independent and impartial courts, including judicial review of administrative acts’.
19 On access to justice more generally see, among others, Cappelletti, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution Pro-
cesses within the Framework of the World-Wide Access-to-Justice Movement’ (1993) 56 Modern Law
Review 282; Storskrubb and Ziller, ‘Access to Justice in European Comparative Law’ in Francioni (ed), Access
to Justice as a Human Right (2007) 177; Bondy and Sunkin, ‘Accessing Judicial Review’ (2008) Public Law
647.
20 Voyatzis, ‘The Right to Legal Assistance Free of Charge in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human
Rights’ (2012) 1 Cyprus Human Rights Law Review 42.
21 On this point, the background to the adoption of the EU Directive is insightful; see Cras and De Matteis,
‘The Directive on the Right to Interpretation and Translation in Criminal Proceedings: Genesis and
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This article argues that restrictions to the right to interpretation undermine access to
justice. There cannot be effective access if the accused person, even if they are assisted
with a lawyer, they are unable to understand or participate in the proceedings. Partic-
ularly during the last decades, however, accounts assessing the reality on the ground
have found that equal justice is an illusion.22 Significant cuts in legal aid affect the most
vulnerable groups, thereby undermining access to justice.23 In this context, it has rightly
been acknowledged that ‘[c]ourt interpreters play a major role in guaranteeing access
to justice for court users’.24 That is even more so in an era in which people move across
countries to find a new home or for other purposes.25 Yet, evidence from the Council
of Europe26 and the EU27 suggests that states often fail to meet their obligations.
This matter will be returned to below, in the analysis of the interplay between legal
assistance/legal aid and interpretation in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court.
3. INTERPRETING THE RIGHT TO INTERPRETATION
IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Some preliminary remarks on the interpretation of the Convention by the Court
are appropriate as they will inform the subsequent analysis of the Court’s jurispru-
dence. The Court has not developed a consistent method of interpretation of the
Convention,28 in the sense that it does not follow a pre-determined number of steps
in order to deploy its interpretative techniques. Accordingly, such techniques often
interact with each other or are used in a complementary way. Indeed, the Court is
provided with (or created for itself) a pool of ‘instruments’ that can be used, depending
on the circumstances of the case, the right in question and broader considerations
underpinning the Convention system (such as workload implications, the reform of
the Convention and the Court, subsidiarity, legitimacy and so on). For applicants and
commentators, the rather fragmented approach to interpretation could create uncer-
tainty or inconsistencies: thus, the Court’s reasoning has understandably been subject
to criticism.29 Nevertheless, it should also be remembered that the ECtHR operates
22 Rhode, ‘Access to Justice’ (2001) 69 Fordham Law Review 1785.
23 See the various contributions in Flynn and Hodgson (eds), Access to Justice and Legal Aid: Comparative
Perspectives on Unmet Legal Need (2017); and also Palmer et al. (eds), Access to Justice: Beyond the Policies
and Politics of Austerity (2016).
24 European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) ‘Report on European judicial systems—
Edition 2014 (2012 data): efficiency and quality of justice’ at 452.
25 European Commission Green Paper, ‘Procedural Safeguards for Suspects and Defendants in Criminal
Proceedings throughout the European Union’ COM(2003) 75 final, at 26.
26 CEPEJ Report (n 24) 453 et seq.
27 Many states have failed to correctly transpose into their domestic legal systems the Directive on the right to
interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings. See Report from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council on the implementation of Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings,
COM/2018/857 final. The Commission’s report was postponed due to delays in transposition in many
member states. The delayed report was also the subject of a complaint before the European Ombudsman;
see European Ombudsman Case 969/2017/LM.
28 Various commentators have raised this point. See, among others, Rainey, Wicks and Ovey, The European
Convention on Human Rights (2017) 83; Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion
under the European Convention on Human Rights (2000) 14.
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under the subsidiarity principle,30 which means that occasionally, it has to defer to
national authorities (most notably by referring to the well-known and often criticised,
too, margin of appreciation doctrine)31 , while simultaneously stressing that they have
the primary responsibility to guarantee the Convention rights and provide redress in
the first place.32 In addition, the near-impossibility of a Court established over 60 years
ago to produce a formidably coherent and impeccable body of case-law should also be
acknowledged.
The Court has referred to the Vienna Convention33 in its jurisprudence; yet, as
commentators have pointed out, while the Vienna Convention is an ongoing source
of inspiration, it does not provide a full picture of the ‘innovative techniques of inter-
pretation’ developed by the ECtHR.34 It has also been argued that the references to
the Vienna Convention in the case-law of the Court are rather limited—which cannot
be easily explained since ‘Articles 31–32 VCLT neither directly rule out originalism nor
prescribe it’.35
Despite such fragmented picture, ‘[t]here would appear to be two core principles
of interpretation: that which seeks to effect the object and purpose of the Convention
(the teleological approach) and that which seeks to give it a practical and effective
application in light of present day conditions (the evolutive approach)’.36 Others
underline that the effectiveness principle points to the ‘object and purpose’ of the
Convention (under Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention), which is the protection
of human rights.37 It has also been argued that effectiveness is ‘an overarching approach
to human rights treaty interpretation’ that ‘animates a range of other more fine-grained,
specific interpretive principles’, which in the ECHR context include ‘the interpretive
principles of “autonomous concepts,” “living instrument” and “practicality”’.38
30 In accordance with Article 1 of Protocol 15 ECHR, which entered into force on 1 August 2021, the
preamble to the Convention was amended and a reference to the margin of appreciation and subsidiarity was
included therein. See further, among others, Vogiatzis, ‘When “reform” meets “judicial restraint”: Protocol
15 amending the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2015) 66 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 127.
31 The literature on the margin of appreciation is very broad. From more recent contributions see, among
others, Gerards, ‘Margin of Appreciation and Incrementalism in the Case Law of the European Court of
Human Rights’ (2018) 18 Human Rights Law Review 495; Arnardóttir, ‘Rethinking the Two Margins of
Appreciation’ (2016) 12 European Constitutional Law Review 27.
32 This quintessential requirement of the Convention system was more recently underlined in the Copen-
hagen Declaration, available at: www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Copenhagen_Declaration_ENG.pdf .
33 The key provisions are Articles 31 (general rule of interpretation), 32 (supplementary means of interpreta-
tion) and 33 (interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages) of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties.
34 Mowbray, ‘The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2005) 5 Human Rights Law Review 57
at 59–60 (and references cited therein); see also Ulfstein, ‘Interpretation of the ECHR in light of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (2020) 24 International Journal of Human Rights 917.
35 Letsas, ‘Strasbourg’s Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer’ (2010) 21 European Journal
of International Law 509 at 514. The author claims (at 513) that ‘what all these techniques [by the ECtHR]
have in common is the rejection of originalist ideas about interpretation, according to which the meaning of
fundamental rights is somewhat fixed or “frozen in time”’. See further on originalism, among others, Scalia,
‘Originalism: The Lesser Evil’ (1989) 57 University of Cincinnati Law Review 849.
36 Rainey et al. (n 28) 83.
37 Ulfstein (n 34) 919.
38 Çalı, ‘Specialised Rules of Treaty Interpretation: Human Rights’ in Hollis (ed) The Oxford Guide to Treaties
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It is therefore plausible to suggest that these principles are connected—not only in
the sense that they are often used in support of each other in the case-law of the Court,39
but also because they support the proposition that the ECtHR has never wholeheart-
edly embraced solely a textual approach to the interpretation of the Convention.40
Ultimately, the Court seeks to achieve a ‘balance between development and stability’.41
In this context, the reference to ‘evolution’ in the title of the article encompasses all the
interpretative techniques of the Strasbourg Court which point to the development of
the rights and guarantees for the defendant that stem from Article 6(3)(e) ECHR.
The term ‘evolution’ does, of course, point to evolutive interpretation: the Strasbourg
Court has been emphasising that ‘the Convention is a living instrument which . . . must
be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’.42 Evolutive interpretation (which
is not particular to this specific regional system43) can be contrasted with textualist
and originalist interpretations of human rights texts.44 This is not to suggest, however,
that the drafters’ intentions, particularly as illustrated in preparatory work, have not
been quoted by the Strasbourg Court.45 Evolutive interpretation is connected with the
need to realise the object and purpose of the Convention. Following the text of the Vienna
Convention, the ECtHR (via what is also termed as teleological interpretation) may
be guided by the Convention’s preamble (as it did in Golder) or may also pronounce,
as it did in Loizidou,46 that the Convention is a ‘constitutional instrument of European
public order’.47 Often, the Court will link the ‘effectiveness of rights’ with the ‘object and
purpose’ of the Convention.48 Indeed, the guaranteed rights under the ECHR should
be practical and effective. More recent formulations of this doctrine refer to the need,
for contracting states, to ‘guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights
that are practical and effective’.49 This obviously entails that the effectiveness of rights
should not be undermined by states, while occasionally, it has been used by the Court
to underline states’ positive obligations.50
39 And, indeed, in the case-law of other regional systems as well. Çalı has observed, for example, that ‘[t]he
regional systems in the Americas, Europe, and Africa have adopted effective interpretation in favour of
individuals rather than sovereign states as the central canon of interpreting human rights treaties. A corollary
of this is the interpretation of human rights treaties as “living instruments,” allowing their interpretation to
be responsive to changing social, political, and moral developments in contemporary societies’; see Çalı,
‘Regional Protection’ in Moeckli et al. (eds), International Human Rights Law (2017) 411 at 420.
40 See Letsas (n 35).
41 Dzehtsiarou, ‘European Consensus and the Evolutive Interpretation of the European Court of Human
Rights’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1730. For that author, European consensus ‘mitigates the “surprise
effect” of evolutive interpretation’ (on p. 1745).
42 Tyrer v UK, Application 5856/72, 25 April 1978, para 31.
43 Çalı (n 39).
44 See further Fredman, Comparative Human Rights Law (2018) ch 5.
45 It is a matter of debate whether the drafters’ intentions and evolutive interpretation are ‘antithetical
approaches’; for an account stressing that they are not, see Concurring Opinion of Judge Sicilianos, joined
by Judge Raimondi in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary, Application 18,030/11, 8 November 2016.
46 Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections), Application 15318/89, 23 March 1995, para 75.
47 See further Harris et al., The Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (2018) 6–8.
48 See, for example, Soering v UK, Application 14038/88, 7 July 1989, para 87; Magyar Helsinki Bizottság (n
45) para 155.
49 See, for example, Matthews v UK, Application 24833/94, 18 February 1999, para 34; United Communist
Party of Turkey and Others v Turkey, Application 19392/92, 30 January 1998, para 33.






/hrlr/advance-article/doi/10.1093/hrlr/ngab027/6457966 by guest on 09 D
ecem
ber 2021
Interpreting the Right to Interpretation under Article 6(3)(e) ECHR • 9
The subsequent examination of the case-law is divided into three parts.51 The first
part will consider the interpretation of the aforementioned article in light of the general
interpretative techniques employed by the Strasbourg Court; the next part will focus
on the Court’s interpretation of Article 6(3)(e) vis-à-vis the overall fairness of the
proceedings; and the third part will assess the standards of the right to interpretation
in connection with the Court’s jurisprudence on legal assistance.
A. Article 6(3)(e) ECHR and General Interpretative Techniques
The first judgment of the Court on Article 6(3)(e) ECHR was in Luedicke, Belkacem and
Koc52—delivered a few years after Golder (which was also cited in the judgment). The
Court found in favour of the individual via relying (primarily) on the ‘ordinary meaning
of terms’. This follows from Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention; the Court will have
to ‘ascertain the ordinary meaning to be given to the words in their context’.53 Thus,
despite developing own methods (and often terminology as well), it may be argued
‘that the Court sees no contradiction between the ECHR as a human rights instrument
and its interpretation based on accepted canons of interpretation, where the Vienna
Convention has a particular role’.54
In Luedicke, Belkacem and Koç, the Court resorted to this rule of interpretation, as
well as to the ‘object and purpose’ of Article 6(3)(e) ECHR, to confirm that interpre-
tation should be free of charge and reject the respondent’s argument that the accused
person may need to pay fees if they are convicted.55 The ECtHR emphasised that the
term ‘free’, as well as the corresponding term in the French version of the Convention
(‘gratuitement’) ‘denote neither a conditional remission, not a temporary exemption,
nor a suspension, but a once and for all exemption or exoneration’.56 Elsewhere, the
Court emphasised the inconsistency of a high domestic court on this matter (an
earlier domestic case had exempted the applicant from paying interpretation fees) and
underlined that, while the Strasbourg Court cannot substitute itself for the national
court, it nevertheless has the responsibility to verify that the effects of the interpretation
of domestic law are compatible with the Convention.57
The characterisation of the evolution in the Court’s jurisprudence as ‘cautious’
is confirmed in Protopapa. Therein, the ECtHR resorted to textual interpretation to
underline that Article 6(3)(e) ECHR refers to an ‘interpreter’, not a ‘translator’, which
51 The following sources were relied upon in the identification of cases: the searchable HUDOC database,
available at: hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng; European Court of Human Rights, ‘Guide on Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights: Right to a fair trial (criminal limb)’ (2019), available at:
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_criminal_ENG.pdf; European Legal Interpreters and Trans-
lators Association, ‘Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights on Language Assistance in Criminal
Proceedings’ complied by Brannan, available at: eulita.eu/wp/case-law/; EU Fundamental Rights Agency
Study (n 3). Thus, a complete picture is provided on the jurisprudential developments concerning Article
6(3)(e) ECHR.
52 Luedicke, Belkacem and Koc v Germany, Applications 6210/73, 6877/75 and 7132/75, 28 November 1978.
53 See, among others, Demir and Baykara v Turkey, Application 34,503/97, 12 November 2008, para 65.
54 Ulfstein (n 34) 918.
55 Luedicke, Belkacem and Koc (n 52) paras 39–40 and 42.
56 Ibid., para 40.
57 Işyar v Bulgaria, Application 391/03, 20 November 2008, paras 47–48. See also Hovanesian v Bulgaria,
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entails that ‘oral linguistic assistance may satisfy the requirements of the Convention’.58
This obviously pertains to the quality of the interpretation that should be provided by
states, a matter that is returned to below. In the more recent case of Bokhonko, though,
the Court—while not finding a violation of Article 6(3)(e) and reiterating that ‘the
Convention does not require a written translation of all items of official documents
and that oral linguistic assistance may satisfy the requirements of the Convention’—
did emphasise the need for the accused person to receive such linguistic assistance so
as to participate in the trial against them.59
In Engel, one of the leading cases on the scope of Article 6, the Court established
that the term ‘criminal’ has an autonomous meaning,60 distinct from its understanding
in domestic law and then went on to establish criteria to identify whether the charge
in question (which could be disciplinary or regulatory in national law) falls within the
scope of Article 6, autonomously understood.61 The same approach was then followed
to establish the applicability of Article 6(3)(e) ECHR in Öztürk.62 The case (and the
arguments put forward by the respondent) focused on the relevance of Article 6(3)(e)
ECHR in an offence classified as ‘regulatory’ under German law. On the basis of the
criteria developed in Engel, the Strasbourg Court found, among others, that nothing
suggests that ‘a certain degree of seriousness’ is required in order for the offence to
fall under Article 6 ECHR and that the ‘general character of the rule and the purpose
of the penalty, being both deterrent and punitive, suffice to show that the offence in
question was . . . criminal in nature’.63 Another consideration (already part of the
criteria established in Engel) was the classification of the offence in the ‘vast majority’
of states. Overall, a majority of judges found a violation of Article 6(3)(e) ECHR.
The progressive evolution of the scope and guarantees under the right to interpreta-
tion took place also via the ‘practical and effective rights’ principle. As specified by the
Court in Kamasinski, in order for the right established under Article 6(3)(e) ECHR
to be practical and effective, the domestic authorities have an additional obligation
beyond the appointment of an interpreter: ‘if they are put on notice in the particular
circumstances, [their obligation] may also extend to a degree of subsequent control over
the adequacy of the interpretation provided’.64 A further and particularly important
development concerned pre-trial proceedings: according to the Court, the right to
interpreter ‘applies not only to oral statements made at the trial hearing but also to
documentary material and the pre-trial proceedings’.65 In order to develop this (no
doubt indispensable) requirement under Article 6(3)(e) ECHR, the Court also relied
on the fairness of the proceedings (it should be remembered that the text of the said
58 Protopapa v Turkey, Application 16,084/90, 24 February 2009, para 80.
59 Bokhonko v Georgia, Application 6739/11, 22 October 2020, paras 103–104. The Court observed, in
addition, that ‘at all the principal stages of the proceedings the applicant was provided with interpreting
services’.
60 See further Letsas, ‘The Truth in Autonomous Concepts: How to Interpret the ECHR’ (2004) 15 European
Journal of International Law 279.
61 See Engel and Others v The Netherlands, Applications 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72 and 5370/72,
8 June 1976, in particular paras 80–82.
62 Öztürk v Germany, Application 8544/79, 21 February 1984.
63 Ibid., para 53.
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provision refers to the ‘language used in court’). This matter is returned to in the next
sub-section of this article.
The scope of contracting parties’ positive obligations was developed further in
Vizgirda.66 In this case, it is submitted that the Court relied heavily on the protection
afforded under EU law and, more specifically, Directive 2010/64. Thus, before elab-
orating on this case, it is useful to provide some introductory remarks on the Court’s
comparative method. Much has been written over the last years about consensus and the
comparative method of the Court.67 European consensus has rightly been described as
the bridge between evolutive interpretation and the margin of appreciation68—with a
crucial disclaimer that the guidance of the comparative exercise often, but not always,
informs the Court’s approach to the margin of appreciation.69 Yet, the comparative
method exceeds ‘European consensus’: a usual source of inspiration can often be the EU
legal order. Thus, although the Court has generally refrained from deploying European
consensus in the field of Article 6(3)(e) ECHR,70 it is submitted that EU law has
supported the ‘evolution’ of the guarantees under the said provision.
Indeed, in Vizgirda, the Court initially made a crucial statement about the fairness of
the trial, a point that is also linked to the discussion of the next sub-section:
it is incumbent on the authorities involved in the proceedings, in particular the
domestic courts, to ascertain whether the fairness of the trial requires, or has
required, the appointment of an interpreter to assist the defendant . . . this
duty is not confined to situations where the foreign defendant makes an explicit
request for interpreting . . . it arises whenever there are reasons to suspect that
the defendant is not proficient enough in the language of the proceedings.71
The Court went on to solidify states’ positive obligations with reference to EU Directive
2010/64.72 In particular, the Directive ‘requires member States to ensure that a proce-
dure or mechanism is in place to ascertain whether suspected or accused persons speak
and understand the language of the criminal proceedings and whether they need the
assistance of an interpreter’.73 Drawing inspiration from another piece of EU legislation
66 Vizgirda v Slovenia, Application 59,868/08, 28 August 2018.
67 Different types of consensus have been used by the ECtHR: domestic, international, expert or ‘European’;
see Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights (2015) 39.
‘European consensus’ is a comparative analysis of law and practices across the Council of Europe, with a
view to identifying a trend (ibid., at 45).
68 Ibid., 23–4 (and references cited therein).
69 Vogiatzis, ‘The Relationship between European Consensus, the Margin of Appreciation and the Legitimacy
of the Strasbourg Court’ (2019) 25 European Public Law 445.
70 One exception might be Öztürk (n 62, para 53): Following the criteria established in Engel, the ECtHR
relied inter alia on the comparative method (without explicitly using the term consensus) to find that in the
vast majority of contracting parties, the applicant’s misconduct would be part of criminal law.
71 Vizgirda (n 66) para 81.
72 See n 4 above. As the Commission has underlined, the Directive ‘contributes to the general objective of
increasing mutual trust by improving the application of the mutual recognition principle, the cornerstone
of the EU area of freedom, security and justice’; see Report from the Commission (n 27) 1.
73 Ibid., para 82. The ECtHR paid particular attention to recitals 21 and 22 of the EU Directive. Recital 22 is
worded as follows: ‘[i]nterpretation and translation under this Directive should be provided in the native
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seeking to safeguard the defendant’s rights, namely Article 3 of Directive 2012/13 EU,74
an additional crucial finding of the Court in this case was states’ obligation to actually
notify the applicant of the right to interpretation; and, of course, ‘to be meaningful’, the
notification as well should be provided in a language that they understand.
In the present case, the national authorities had not ‘expressly verif[ied]’ whether
the applicant could understand the interpretation and translation that was provided; the
‘effective protection’ of this right mandated otherwise, however.75 A violation of Articles
6(1) and 6(3) was found. In a carefully worded opinion, two dissenting judges raised
concerns not only about the extent of the verification requirements but also about the
fact that EU law was relied upon to set new standards.76 If anything, such development
had to be undertaken by the Grand Chamber, they submitted.77 But it is also possible
to situate this judgment in the context of a progressive evolution of Article 6(3)(e)
ECHR as well. This case, in particular, underlines states’ positive obligations in this
area; and it also signifies, perhaps, that the jurisprudence of the Court is progressively
shifting the burden from the individual (for example, by requiring that they duly
communicate/explain their linguistic requirements to the national authorities) towards
the state.
B. The Fairness of the Proceedings
What is the link between Article 6(3)(e) ECHR and the overall fairness of the proceed-
ings? This article argues that every violation of the right to interpretation undermines
the overall fairness of the proceedings. This approach gives further effect to the require-
ments of the rule of law, as explained in an earlier section. The extent to which the Court
follows this approach in its jurisprudence on the right to interpretation will be the focus
of this section.
Before exploring this issue further, it is necessary to address in broader terms the link
between the ‘fairness’ of the trial under Article 6(1) and the guarantees under Article
6(3) ECHR in the Court’s jurisprudence. For the Court is often relying on the ‘overall
fairness of the trial’ in a different, and indeed very problematic, way: instead of finding
that when a violation under Article 6(3) takes place, the trial is not fair, occasionally
it seeks to establish whether further guarantees under Article 6 which may have been
respected by the respondent could effectively compensate for the violation, thereby
rendering the ‘overall’ trial fair. This very problematic approach has been criticised in
the literature—and this author subscribes to these critical remarks.
It is noted, of course, that fairness as a notion goes beyond the text of Article
6. A broader theoretical inquiry has revealed that ‘key principles’ of fairness include
‘transparency, consistency, equality and impartiality’.78 Thus, ascertaining how the
Court addresses the link between the guarantees of Article 6(3) and the fairness of the
order to allow them fully to exercise their right of defence, and in order to safeguard the fairness of the
proceedings’.
74 Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to
information in criminal proceedings [2012] OJ L 142/1.
75 Vizgirda (n 66) para 93.
76 Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Kucsko-Stadlmayer and Bošnjak in Vizgirda (n 66), paras 1–8.
77 Ibid., para 7.
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trial becomes even more important in light of these broader principles underpinning
the notion.
Lemmens examined the possible implications that could arise when the Strasbourg
Court examines the first and third paragraphs of Article 6 together: there is a danger that
a more ‘“result”-oriented’ Court will evaluate the ‘overall fairness of the proceedings’,
with the implication that if one of the guarantees is found wanting, but the overall
fairness would be deemed satisfactory, there would be no violation of Article 6.79
The Strasbourg Court in Salduz (which is also discussed below) stated that ‘the right
set out in Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention is one element, among others, of the
concept of a fair trial in criminal proceedings contained in Article 6 § 1’.80 In Al-
Khawaja and Tahery, the Court cited the above paragraph as authority to claim that ‘the
Court has always interpreted Article 6 § 3 in the context of an overall examination of
the fairness of the proceedings’.81 As Lemmens noted, the two formulations ‘[do] not
exactly state the same thing’.82 Indeed, it is an intellectual leap that is neither defensible
nor warranted. The ‘overall examination’ appears to undermine the significance of each
of the guarantees listed in the third paragraph of Article 6.
Along similar lines, and having explored some of the inconsistencies in the Court’s
approach, Treschel argued convincingly as follows:
There are . . . a number of cases in which the ECtHR first found that one of the
specific guarantees had not been complied with but that the trial, when examined
as a whole, had nevertheless been fair. This is certainly not an interpretation
which can be reconciled with the English text – ‘minimum rights’; the French
‘notamment’ is slightly less compelling. Still, the accused has a right to a fair
trial; in particular, he or she has certain minimum rights. How can a trial be
fair if a minimum right was disregarded? This is only possible if fairness is not
understood as a clear-cut right, but rather as some sort of an ideal or ‘non-
epistemic’ consideration. I am not aware of any rule of interpretation which would
permit such flagrant disregard of the unambiguous text of a treaty.83
In a thorough study of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on the criminal limb of Article 6,
Goss drew upon ‘formalist accounts of the rule of law’, including by Raz and Fuller (i.e.
the law should be clear, predictable, transparent, etc.) to assess whether the ECtHR’s
case-law on Article 6 meets this objective;84 he was strongly of the view that it does
not. Among others, the ‘internal structure’ of that article was explored.85 This matters
79 Lemmens (n 2) 311–313.
80 Salduz v Turkey, Application 36,391/02, 27 November 2008, para 50.
81 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v the United Kingdom, Application Nos. 26,766/05 and 22,228/06, 15 December
2011, para 143.
82 Lemmens (n 2) 312 (fn 95).
83 Treschel, ‘The Character of the Right to a Fair Trial’ in Jackson and Summers (eds), Obstacles to Fairness
in Criminal Proceedings: Individual Rights and Institutional Forms (2018) 19 at 25 (emphasis in the original,
footnotes have been omitted).
84 Goss (n 2) 5–6; as the author explained, this formalist understanding of the rule of law was his ‘measuring
stick’.
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because ‘an understanding of the way that the European Court approaches the internal
structure of Article 6 is crucial to understanding the way that the Court deals with
the question of when Article 6 has been violated’.86 Having identified a plethora of
inconsistencies in the Court’s reasoning, he proposed a more focused approach to the
specific requirements of Article 6(3) ECHR, while noting that, if a violation of these
provisions is not found, it would still be possible for the ‘broader Article 6 guarantee
of a fair trial’ to have been violated.87 Elsewhere, and with reference to Ibrahim,88 he
provided a critique as to why the evaluation of the fairness of the proceedings ‘as a
whole’ ‘relegate[s] the Article 6(3) rights to subsidiary status’, contrary to the text of
the ECHR.89
It should also be noted that, beyond the confines of the ECHR, McDermott
observed that an ‘approach of full respect for each of the rights of the accused is
preferable to some of the limited jurisprudence that seeks to refer to the fairness “as
a whole” of proceedings’.90
There appears to be scholarly agreement, then, that the overall evaluation of the
fairness of the trial in the way that it is often used by the Strasbourg Court could in essence
undermine the rights under Article 6(3). Simultaneously, the imperfect wording of
Article 6 should be acknowledged,91 and therefore it may not be straightforward for
the Court to deal with an imperfect provision. It appears, however, that it would be
preferable (or at least plausible) for every finding of a violation under Article 6(3),
or even 6(2) and 6(1) ECHR, to be accompanied with a violation of Article 6 as a
whole. That would probably underline the importance of the fairness of the trial as a
whole and would also signify that every violation of a ‘component fair trial right’92
undermines the fairness of the trial. It would also serve legal certainty and facilitate
applicants’ submissions as well: for example, in the below cases in which a violation of
the right to interpretation was alleged, certain applicants claimed a violation of Article
6; others a combination of 6(1) and 6(3)(e); or a combination of 6(1) and 6(3); or a
violation of 6(3)(e) only.
It is now appropriate to return to the earlier question: how has the Strasbourg
Court dealt with the right to interpretation vis-à-vis the fairness of the trial? In its
first judgment on Article 6(3)(e) ECHR, delivered shortly after Golder, the Court
found that paying for interpretation costs ‘may have repercussions for [the accused
person’s] exercise of the right to a fair trial as safeguarded by Article 6’.93 But it was
in Kamasinski where the link between interpretation rights and fairness was solidified:
the ‘guarantees in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 6 . . . represent constituent elements
of the general concept of a fair trial embodied in paragraph 1’.94 Placing the guarantee
86 Ibid., 66.
87 Ibid., 87.
88 Ibrahim and Others v the United Kingdom, Applications 50,541/08, 50,571/08, 50,573/08 and 40,351/09,
13 September 2016.
89 Goss, ‘Out of Many, One? Strasbourg’s Ibrahim Decision on Article 6’ (2017) 80 Modern Law Review 1137
at 1146.
90 McDermott (n 78) 39.
91 See also on this point Summers (n 2) 102–3.
92 With reference to Article 14 ICCPR, Clooney and Webb (n 7, at 7) identified 13 component rights.
93 Luedicke, Belkacem and Koc (n 52) para 42.
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in the context of fair trial under Article 6(1) (and taking also into account the earlier
Luedicke, Belkacem and Koc judgment) enabled the ECtHR to deduce the principle that
the right to interpretation applies not only to oral statements at the trial hearing but also
to ‘documentary material and pre-trial proceedings’.95 The Strasbourg Court clarified,
however, that the said provision does not go as far as requiring translation of all evidence
or official documents in the procedure; the ‘interpretation assistance provided should
be such as to enable the defendant to have knowledge of the case against him and to
defend himself, notably by being able to put before the court his version of the events’.96
In Amer, the Strasbourg Court reiterated that the interpretation right at the pre-trial
stage ensures a fair trial, and key considerations for the interpretation of this right are
the defendant’s linguistic knowledge and the nature of the offence.97 The absence of an
interpreter during questioning by the police (and the lack of appropriate steps taken by
domestic authorities, including courts, to redress this) constituted a violation of Article
6(1) taken in conjunction with Article 6(3)(e) ECHR.98
When the Court decides to examine a complaint under these provisions taken
together, occasionally, it might also emphasise the link between the concept of fair
trial and the guarantees under Article 6(3) ECHR.99 In Cuscani, despite assurances by
counsel that the applicant could understand the language used in court, the ECtHR
found a violation of Articles 6(1) and 6(3)(e) ECHR, given that, once the judge—as
the ‘ultimate guardian of the fairness of the proceedings’—is put on notice, they have
the responsibility to ensure that the absence of an interpreter ‘would not prejudice the
applicant’s full involvement in a matter of crucial importance’ for them.100
A further powerful manifestation of the impact of the absence of appropriate inter-
pretation on the fairness of the trial can be found in Baytar. Therein, the ECtHR
examined the complaint under Articles 6(1) and 6(3)(e) taken together; it underlined
that, ‘like the assistance of a lawyer, that of an interpreter should be provided from the
investigation stage, unless it is demonstrated that there are compelling reasons to restrict
this right’; this ‘defect’ at the initial stage, despite the presence of an interpreter when
the applicant was questioned before a judge, was sufficient to impair the fairness of
the proceedings as a whole and led to a violation of the aforementioned provisions
taken together.101 Likewise, in Şaman, the Court found a violation of both the right
to legal assistance and the right to an interpreter, in conjunction with Article 6(1)
of the Convention (the fairness of the trial), since the applicant’s defence rights were
‘irretrievably affected’.102
95 Ibid., para 74.
96 Ibid.
97 Amer v Turkey, Application 25,720/02, 13 January 2009, paras 77–78.
98 Ibid., paras 83–84.
99 See, for example, Mariani v France, Application 43, 640/98, 31 March 2005, para 39.
100 Cuscani v UK, Application 32,771/96, 24 September 2002, paras 38–9.
101 Baytar v Turkey, Application 45,440/04, 14 October 2014, paras 48–59 (emphasis added). The Court also
referred to the leading Salduz judgment, which is discussed further below.
102 Şaman v Turkey, Application 35,292/05, 5 April 2011, in particular paras 34–37. The Court emphasised
that ‘without the help of an interpreter, [the applicant] could not reasonably have appreciated the conse-
quences of accepting to be questioned without the assistance of a lawyer in a criminal case concerning the
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Importantly, in Vizgirda, the Court developed further states’ positive obligations
with regard to the right to interpretation, also on the basis of the ‘prominent place held
in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial’; the domestic authorities, and notably
courts, have a duty to ‘ascertain whether the fairness of the trial requires, or has required,
the appointment of an interpreter to assist the defendant’.103 The Court’s conclusion is
also noteworthy: ‘it has not been established . . . that the applicant received language
assistance such as to allow him to participate actively in the trial against him. This, in
the Court’s view, is sufficient to render the trial as a whole unfair’.104
One should therefore deduce from the above cases that not only has the Court
acknowledged the link between the right to interpretation and the fairness of the trial in
more general terms, but also that it has found that violations of the right to interpretation
undermine fairness, thereby constituting also violations of the right to a fair trial. By doing
so, the Court has taken further steps towards the ‘cautious evolution’ of Article 6(3)(e)
ECHR. This approach does, of course, entail a higher degree of scrutiny over domestic
laws and practice. This is, however, desirable, if not indispensable: the requirements of
Article 6(3) ECHR, including the right to interpretation, are quintessential aspects of
the rule of law and access to justice, as explained in earlier sections.
Nevertheless, there have been few occasions in which the Court decided to use the
‘overall fairness’ test in the abovementioned problematic way. These instances should
be highlighted and criticised. The key judgment in this respect is Hovanesian, where
the Strasbourg Court, although accepting that the accused person did not have access
to a lawyer and interpretation during the first hours of police custody, was nonetheless
satisfied that the overall impact on the fairness of the trial was not such to merit a finding
of violation.105 The fact that a separate violation of the right to interpretation was found
because the applicant had been ordered to cover the interpretation fees106 should not
distract attention from the earlier problematic finding. Questions could also be raised
regarding the Court’s approach in Panasenko:107 the reasoning of the Court appeared to
unduly focus on the conduct of the accused person at the trial, as opposed to thoroughly
scrutinising states for failing to fully meet their positive obligations. The Court admitted
that there were problems with the interpretation at the hearing, but the applicant did not
specify the extent to which such problems impaired his broader right to a fair trial. The
applicant was also able to understand the essence of the debates and provide his version
of the facts; thus, the claim was ‘manifestly ill-founded’ and was therefore rejected.108
These judgments were delivered before the more recent judgment in Vizgirda which,
as was explained earlier, duly accentuates states’ positive obligations, particularly with
regard to the steps that they need to take to verify the linguistic needs of the accused
person. How Vizgirda may impact the Court’s approach to Article 6(3)(e) in future
cases is a question that will need to be addressed in due course.
illiterate detainees with a view to ensuring that the voluntary nature of a waiver is reliably established and
recorded’ (ibid., para 35).
103 Vizgirda (n 66) para 81.
104 Ibid., para 102.
105 Hovanesian (n 57), in particular para 43.
106 Ibid., paras 49–51.
107 Panasenko v Portugal, Application 10,418/03, 22 July 2008.
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C. The Right to an Interpreter and Legal Assistance/Legal Aid
As was explained in an earlier section, legal assistance/legal aid and interpretation are
quintessential requirements of access to justice. ‘Legal aid’ denotes free legal assistance
to those who cannot afford it.109 Moreover, both rights (and ‘components’ of the
fairness of the trial) imply that states have certain positive obligations that need to be
fulfilled, which also touches upon the appropriate resource provision for the effective
guarantee of these rights. In addition, there have been many cases in which both the
right to interpretation and legal assistance were invoked by the applicant and examined
(sometimes together) by the Strasbourg Court.110 Nevertheless, there is an additional
reason to undertake a comparative examination of the Court’s approach to Articles
6(3)(c) and 6(3)(e) ECHR.
More specifically, another principle developed by the Strasbourg Court (which has
not received extensive scholarly attention) is the internal consistency between the Conven-
tion’s provisions. The Court has rightly pointed out that the Convention ‘must . . . be
read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and
harmony between its various provisions’;111 elsewhere, it has re-phrased this principle
as follows: ‘the provisions of the Convention must be construed in the light of the entire
Convention system, including the Protocols’.112 Thus, the consistency between the
jurisprudence on legal aid and the right to interpretation (both featuring in Article 6(3)
ECHR) is certainly a matter worth considering in an account that seeks to understand
how the right to interpretation has been interpreted. Of course, it may be observed
that there are links between the right to interpretation and further rights of defence
under Article 6(3) ECHR. The right to interpretation benefits from a close affinity with
Article 6(3)(a) ECHR;113 yet, this right has not given rise to substantial jurisprudence.
Arguably, there is also a link with Article 5(2) ECHR;114 but this path of enquiry will
not be pursued further here.115
109 See, relatedly, Article 3 of Directive (EU) 2016/1919 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
26 October 2016 on legal aid for suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings and for requested
persons in European arrest warrant proceedings [2016] OJ L 297/1, which is worded as follows: ‘“[L]egal
aid” means funding by a Member State of the assistance of a lawyer, enabling the exercise of the right of
access to a lawyer’.
110 See, among others, Mariani (n 99); Panasenko (n 107); Cuscani (n 100); Hermi v Italy, Application
18,114/02, 18 October 2006; Lagerblom v Sweden, Application 26,891/95, 14 January 2003; Şaman (n
102); Knox v Italy, Application 76,577/13, 24 January 2019.
111 Stec and Others v UK (Decision), Applications 65,731/01 and 65,900/01, 6 July 2005, para 48.
112 Maaouia v France, Application 39,652/98, 5 October 2000, para 36.
113 Article 6(3)(a) ECHR provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right ‘to be informed
promptly, in a language which [they understand] and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation
against [them]’.
114 Article 5(2) ECHR provides that ‘[e]veryone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language
which [they understand], of the reasons for [their] arrest and of any charge against [them].
115 It should be noted that Article 5, including its second paragraph, applies to any conditions of deprivation
of liberty and detention, thereby going beyond the field of application of Article 6(3) ECHR, which is
confined to criminal procedures. Simultaneously, Article 5 is narrower, in the sense that it cannot apply
to ‘unarrested persons concerning whom a preliminary investigation has commenced, provided they are
“substantially affected”’. See further Harris et al (n 47) 468. More generally, as Harris and colleagues point
out, Articles 5(2) and 6(3) arguably serve different purposes: the former ‘seeks to assist the arrested person
in challenging’ their detention, while the later guarantees are rights of defence granted to the accused
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The requirement of internal consistency between the Convention’s provisions that was
underlined in the earlier paragraph necessitates an enquiry concerning the interplay,
consistency and respective standards between the various guarantees under Article
6(3) ECHR. In addition, the ECtHR has specified that the requirements of Article 6(3)
ECHR enable the accused person to participate effectively in the proceedings; ‘effective
participation’ includes the assistance of a lawyer or interpreter and the faculty to duly
prepare one’s defence and follow statements by the prosecution witnesses116—which
indicates, again, that such guarantees cannot be viewed and evaluated in isolation. For
the Strasbourg Court, the right to participate in the trial may not be mentioned explicitly
in Article 6(1) ECHR, but its existence can be inferred from the ‘object and purpose
of [Article 6] taken as a whole’.117 The significance of the guarantees under Article
6(3), taken together with Article 6(1) ECHR, was also emphasised in Hermi, where
the ECtHR reiterated how the rights under the third paragraph reinforce the right of
the accused person to participate in the hearing.118
In this context, interesting questions have arisen in the case-law of the Court regard-
ing the relationship between the lawyer (and legal assistance, more generally) and the
interpreter. In Cuscani, the lawyer appointed by the state had advised the court that
they should be able to ‘make do and mend’; the ECtHR found a violation of Articles
6(1) and 6(3)(e) ECHR, while reiterating that, generally, ‘the conduct of the defence
is essentially a matter between the defendant and his counsel, whether counsel be
appointed under a legal aid scheme as in the applicant’s case or be privately financed’.119
In Hermi, a case involving the applicant’s linguistic capacity in Italian, as well as his
participation in the appeal hearing, the Court regretted the lack of communication
between the applicant and his lawyers (who were appointed by the former) but stressed
that a state cannot be held responsible for every shortcoming and is only required to
intervene when the requirements of a fair trial are not met (which was not the case
here).120 In Vizgirda, and citing also Hermi, the ECtHR specified that ‘the failure by the
applicant’s legal representative to raise the issue of interpretation did not . . . relieve
the domestic court of its responsibility under Article 6 of the Convention, given that
national courts are the ‘ultimate guardians of the fairness of the proceedings’.121
The above discussion has already revealed points of convergence between the rights
to legal assistance and interpretation: both legal assistance (unless ‘compelling reasons’
are presented, as the Court explained in Salduz) and interpretation should apply at the
Examination of Language Rights Cases before the European Court of Human Rights’ (2020) 20 Human
Rights Law Review 101.
116 See further Lemmens (n 2) 308, with reference to Güveç v Turkey, Application 70,337/01, 20 January 2009,
para 124.
117 Brozicek v Italy, Application 10,964/84, 19 December 1989, para 45 (in this case finding a violation of Article
6(1), alongside a violation of Article 6(3)(a) ECHR).
118 Hermi (n 110) paras 58–9. See further V. v UK, Application 24,888/94, 16 December 1999, paras 85–7;
Ibrahimov and Others v Azerbaijan, Applications 69,234/11, 69,252/11 and 69,335/11, 11 February 2016,
para 109; Yaroslav Belousov v Russia, Applications 2653/13 and 60,980/14, 4 October 2016, paras 146–9.
119 Cuscani (n 100) para 39.
120 Hermi (n 110) paras 94–5. In particular, the national authorities under Article 6(3)(c) ECHR are required
to intervene ‘only if a failure by legal aid counsel to provide effective representation is manifest or sufficiently
brought to their attention in some other way’ (para 96).
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pre-trial stage; otherwise, the guaranteed rights will not be practical and effective.122
It has been shown that Salduz has had significant effects on the legal systems of many
contracting parties and that it signified a departure from earlier jurisprudence whereby
legal assistance during police interrogation would be assessed in the context of the
overall fairness of the trial123 (a point linked to earlier remarks). In addition, the right
to free interpretation goes further than legal aid, because it is not subject to restrictions,
including when the accused person is convicted; by contrast, legal assistance might be
confined if this is required in the ‘interests of justice’.124
On the basis of the existing literature and the case-law of the Court, the following
matters will also be comparatively examined in this section: the choice of legal assis-
tance125 and interpretation; and the quality of legal assistance126/interpretation and
states’ positive obligations, in this respect. On the choice of legal assistance, a distinction
has to be made between situations in which the costs of representation are paid by the
applicant,127 and those funded by the state via legal aid schemes. In the latter case, the
state’s discretion is broader.128 As the Strasbourg Court has put it, ‘[w]hen appointing
defence counsel the courts must certainly have regard to the accused’s wishes but these
can be overridden when there are relevant and sufficient grounds for holding that this
is necessary in the interests of justice’.129 This also applies when the accused person is
opposed to the appointment of defence counsel.130
In this respect, a positive element in the jurisprudence of the Court on Article
6(3)(e) ECHR is the dissociation of interpretation from legal assistance: in other words,
the lawyer cannot assume the role of the interpreter if the accused person cannot
understand and/or participate in the proceedings.131 Likewise, it is the obligation of
the state (the domestic courts) and not of the accused person or counsel to verify
the need for interpretation.132 Thus, while legal aid and interpretation are connected
as guarantees of Article 6(3) and fundamental elements of access to justice, they are
also distinct rights: this means that the state cannot fulfil its obligations under Article
6(3)(e) when appointing a lawyer who would also assume the role of the interpreter,
while at the same time the accused person cannot understand or speak the language
122 Salduz (n 80) para 55.
123 Giannoulopoulos, ‘Strasbourg Jurisprudence, Law Reform and Comparative Law: A Tale of the Right to
Custodial Legal Assistance in Five Countries’ (2016) 16 Human Rights Law Review 103. Nevertheless,
developments in the post-Salduz case-law have been criticised in the literature: see Goss (n 89); Celiksoy,
‘Overruling “the Salduz Doctrine” in Beuze v Belgium: The ECtHR’s further retreat from the Salduz
principles on the right to access to lawyer’ (2019) 10 New Journal of European Criminal Law 342.
124 Voyatzis (n 20) 48–50.
125 Harris et al. (n 47) 476–9.
126 Guide on Article 6 (n 51) 80–1.
127 For a case concerning a restriction on the free choice of defence which resulted in a violation of Articles
6(1) and 6(3) ECHR, see Zagorodniy v Ukraine, Application 27,004/06, 24 November 2011.
128 Harris et al. (n 47) 479.
129 Lagerblom (n 110) para 54.
130 Croissant v Germany, Application 13,611/88, 25 September 1992, paras 27–32.
131 See Cuscani (n 100) paras 38–9.
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used in court. Evidence for this is also provided by the position that the right to waive
interpretation should be a decision of the accused person and not of the lawyer.133
As the text of Article 6(3)(e) (or 6(3) more generally) does not clearly specify the
relationship between the lawyer and the interpreter, the clarification by the Court that
the two rights are separate represents a further (and welcome) step in the ‘cautious
evolution’ of the right to interpretation. Accordingly, Cuscani confirms one of the earlier
remarks in Vizgirda (a later case): namely, that the Court is progressively shifting the
burden from the individual to the state. As the Court put it, the ‘onus was . . . on the
judge to reassure himself that the absence of an interpreter . . . would not prejudice
the applicant’s full involvement in a matter of crucial importance to him; and the judge
should not have been ‘persuaded by the applicant’s counsel’s confidence’.134
The choice of interpretation rests with the state. This, however, inevitably brings to
the fore the qualifications of the persons who will undertake this role (the quality of
interpretation as such is examined below). The jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court
is rather lenient on states on this matter. The inadmissibility decision in Ucak provides
further clarity.135 Therein, the Court specified that:
The Court considers that it is not appropriate under Article 6 § 3(e) to lay down
any detailed conditions concerning the method by which interpreters may be
provided to assist accused persons. An interpreter is not part of the court or
tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 and there is no formal requirement
of independence or impartiality as such. The services of the interpreter must
provide the accused with effective assistance in conducting his defence and the
interpreter’s conduct must not be of such a nature as to impinge on the fairness
of the proceedings.136
There may be situations in which the Court’s position on the independence and
impartiality (or lack thereof) of the interpreters cannot be substantiated. In Ucak, an—
admittedly insufficiently substantiated—claim was submitted by the applicant that the
interpreter was listed as a witness by the prosecution; yet, it emerges from the case that
this was done to confirm that the interpretation at the police interview was accurate.
Nevertheless, in a future hypothetical case, the domestic courts should not, of course,
be satisfied with the appointment of an interpreter who is a witness proper of the
prosecution. It is hoped that the Strasbourg Court would have to conclude that the fair-
ness of the proceedings would be undermined. Granted, the Convention text does not
appear to go as far as providing for a register of interpreters; by contrast, Article 5(2) of
Directive 2010/64 provides that ‘[i]n order to promote the adequacy of interpretation
and translation and efficient access thereto, Member States shall endeavour to establish
a register or registers of independent translators and interpreters who are appropriately
qualified’. This could be a possible area of further development of the Strasbourg Court’s
133 Guide on Article 6 (n 51) 93, with reference to Kamasinski (n 64) para 80. The author fully shares this view
but notes that the principle was not established so clearly in Kamasinski.
134 Cuscani (n 100) para 38.
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case-law.137 It also noted that the Court’s position is that there is no ‘formal’ requirement
of independence and impartiality, while the EU Directive expects states to at least try
to ensure, via this register, that translators and interpreters should be independent.
Moving on to the quality of legal assistance and interpretation, in both rights, the
rationale to the Court’s case-law is the need to ensure that these rights of defence are
practical and effective. Thus, the contracting parties have obligations that exceed the
appointment of a lawyer or an interpreter, and pertain also to the quality of the service
provided.138 In Lagerblom, the ECtHR specified that the accused person does not have a
right to request the replacement of the defence counsel and reiterated that states do have
to intervene ‘if a failure by public defence counsel to provide effective representation
is manifest or sufficiently brought to their attention in some other way’ but ‘cannot be
held responsible for every shortcoming on the part of a lawyer appointed for legal aid
purposes’.139
The principle that states have certain responsibilities after the appointment of the
interpreter was confirmed in Kamasinksi, Hermi and—more recently—in Vizgirda.
In Knox, where in addition to Article 6(3)(e) the Court also found a violation of
Article 6(3)(c) as well (given that the applicant had not been granted legal assistance
during a police interview), the Court pointed out that the police interpreter undertook
a role exceeding the functions of an interpreter: she ‘sought to build up a personal
and emotional relationship with Ms Knox, seeing herself as a mediator and taking on
a motherly attitude which was not called for in the circumstances’.140 The national
authorities had failed to take steps to identify this issue.141
The above case aptly illustrates that the appointment process and/or the choice of
interpreter pertains also to the quality of interpretation. The earlier remark concerning
the qualifications of the persons undertaking this service (including, perhaps, a reg-
istration process for interpreters) is of relevance. In Knox, the Court reiterated142 the
Ucak jurisprudence on the non-desirability of concrete guidelines for the appointment
of interpreters; clearly, states have a margin of appreciation, in this respect. However,
since the appointment/choice of interpreter could also have an impact on the quality
of interpretation, this is an area in which we might see further developments in the
jurisprudence of the Court. And, of course, Knox is not the only case where issues about
the quality of interpretation emerged—Cuscani is another relevant example,143 among
other cases.
137 On this point, Brannan pointed out that, while the Directive ‘goes much further than any Convention
requirements . . . it merely requires states to “endeavour to establish” such registers’, while also observing
further unclear provisions under Article 5 of the Directive; see Brannan (n 3) 147–8.
138 Regarding legal assistance see, to this effect, Guide on Article 6 (n 51) 80–1. There are aspects of the quality
of legal assistance that do not appear to be applicable to interpretation, such as confidential (in private)
communication between the lawyer and the accused person.
139 Lagerblom (n 110) paras 55–6.
140 Knox (n 110) para 185. The translation of the French text in this paragraph is quoted from the press release
by the Strasbourg Court in English.
141 Ibid., para 186.
142 Ibid., para 184.
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4. FURTHER EVOLUTION OF ARTICLE 6(3)(e) ECHR?
The earlier analysis demonstrated that the standards and guarantees of the right to
interpretation have ‘evolved cautiously’. The Court has relied on established interpre-
tative techniques to interpret this provision and the scope of this right. Of course, it
was acknowledged that there can always be questions or concerns about the Court’s
fragmented approach to interpretation: it can be queried, for example, why a particular
principle was applied in one judgment but ignored in another. In addition, proponents
of a strictly originalist interpretation will no doubt reject developments that do not
‘match’ the precise treaty text, regardless of the time that has elapsed between the case
under review and the adoption of the provision in question. These disclaimers aside,
the progressive development of the right to interpretation is positively assessed in this
contribution. The Court took several necessary steps in order to strengthen the fairness
of the trial and the effective exercise of this right. Simultaneously, the degree of ‘caution’
that was identified in the earlier discussion should not automatically be criticised, given
that, as a jurisdiction of last resort, the Strasbourg Court was perhaps eager to avoid
excessive criticism regarding alleged activism.
It should also be remembered that, as the text of Article 6(3) ECHR indicates, the
rights of defence mentioned therein are minimum procedural guarantees, and also ‘non-
exhaustive’ aspects of the ‘general requirement of fair trial’:144 this means that states can
obviously go further but also, perhaps, that there is scope for the Court to progressively
develop the scope of these rights,145 including the right to interpretation that is the
focus of the present contribution.
This section, therefore, will briefly address the question of the possible further evolu-
tion of Article 6(3)(e) ECHR. If one considers the Court’s reasoning in more recent and
landmark cases, such as Vizgirda, one may assume that the EU legal order will continue
to exercise ‘pressure’ on the Convention system in the foreseeable future. In this respect,
it should be remembered that, although the ECtHR has drawn inspiration from EU law,
it has not gone as far as duplicating the provisions/standards prescribed by Directive
2010/64/EU. Thus, and among other areas, the Strasbourg case-law at present does not
mirror translation rights under Article 3 of the Directive146 (including its interpretation
by the Court of Justice of the European Union).147 The same applies to the quality
of interpretation: if one considers Article 5 of the Directive, one will observe that this
provision clearly refers to appropriate qualifications.148 It is not unreasonable to expect
144 Gamble and Dias (n 2) 33, 52.
145 Nevertheless, as the authors observed (ibid., 52), the Court, as well as the Human Rights Committee, with
reference to Article 14 ICCPR, have not ‘act[ed] expansively on due process issues’. The present account
and the ‘cautious evolution’ argument that it advances regarding the right to interpretation appear to confirm
as much.
146 See further Brannan (n 3) 136; Clooney and Webb (n 7) 582–3, who draw a distinction between ‘necessary’
documents (under ECtHR case-law) and ‘translation of all documents which are essential to ensure that
[suspected or accused persons] are able to exercise their right of defence and to safeguard the fairness of the
proceedings’ under Article 3(1) of the EU Directive.
147 See, in particular, on the definition of ‘essential documents’, Case C-278/16, Frank Sleutjes, EU:C:2017:757.
148 Article 5 also refers to Articles 2(8) (interpretation) and 3(9) (translation) of the Directive. The former
is worded as follows: ‘Interpretation . . . shall be of a quality sufficient to safeguard the fairness of the
proceedings, in particular by ensuring that suspected or accused persons have knowledge of the case against
them and are able to exercise their right of defence.’ The quality of interpretation remains, however, a
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developments in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, in this respect, with a view
to further strengthening interpreters’ independence and impartiality.149 A comparison
with legal assistance as an additional component of access to justice could provide
further justification for this: despite divergent practice across contracting parties, surely
not every person can be appointed as lawyer (including under legal aid schemes).
Lastly, the Court has not considered that it was necessary to rely on the rule of
law in cases involving the right to interpretation.150 That could also be a possible
development that would solidify the link between Article 6(3)(e) ECHR and the
fairness of the proceedings and would signify to states that the guarantees under Article
6(3) ECHR should be respected. For that reason, this article argues that it is also a
necessary development in the jurisprudence of the Court.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article presented the first comprehensive study on how the ECtHR has interpreted
the right to interpretation. The brief answer to this path of enquiry can be summarised
as follows: evolutively, yet simultaneously cautiously. More specifically, it was shown
that the landmark Golder judgment was relied upon to underline the link between the
right to interpretation and the fairness of the trial. Interpretation under all circum-
stances should be free of charge. The fairness of the trial requires that interpretation
should extend to pre-trial proceedings and the investigation stage. And of course, the
‘autonomous concepts’ doctrine applies here as well: it was relied upon by the Court to
scrutinise states’ obligation to provide interpretation, regardless of the categorisation of
the offence in the domestic legal order.
Moreover, the Strasbourg Court has emphasised that the right to interpretation
should be practical and effective: this means that states have positive obligations beyond
the time of the appointment of an interpreter. In particular, they should exercise a
degree of control over the proceedings, with a view to ensuring that the interpretation
meets the appropriate standards. More recently, and drawing inspiration from EU
law, the Strasbourg Court has departed from the position that states should be put
on notice and has clarified that states should act proactively with a view to verifying
whether the accused person requires the assistance of an interpreter. Crucially, states
have also an obligation to notify the accused person of their right to interpretation.
The aforementioned developments signify a jurisprudence which progressively shifts
the burden from the individual to the domestic authorities. Like other guarantees of
Article 6(3) ECHR, appropriate interpretation also enables the individual to participate
effectively in the proceedings.
Considering the internal consistency between the Convention’s provisions, and the
requirements of legal assistance/legal aid and interpretation, more specifically, it was
argued that the Court has rightly dissociated the role of the lawyer from that of the
and of the Council on the Right to Interpretation and Translation in Criminal Proceedings: Transposition
Strategies with regard to Interpretation and Translation’ (2015) 7 Monografías de Traducción e Interpretación
73 at 89–97.
149 See also Brannan (n 3) 147.
150 As it did in Golder or in other cases involving Article 6(1) ECHR. For example, concerning the indepen-
dence of the judiciary see, among others, Baka v Hungary, Application 20,261/12, 23 June 2016, and more
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interpreter. This entails that states will not fulfil their obligations by appointing a lawyer
who might undertake the role of the interpreter as well. Further jurisprudence hints at
qualifications and the need for interpreters to be independent and stay within the remit
of their functions.
Simultaneously, the Court has also been cautious at places: a textual reading of
Article 6(3)(e) suggests that it refers to interpretation, not translation; and regarding
translation, states are not obliged to provide a translation of all evidence or official
documents in the procedure. What matters for the Court appears to be that the accused
person should be able to understand the case against them, to defend themself and,
in particular, to be able to explain before the court their version of events. The Court
has also appeared to adopt a deferential approach to the method of appointment of
interpreters—not least because the text of Article 6(3)(e) does not prescribe any
particular standards or requirements for states. The penultimate section of the article
also underlined that, however ‘evolutive’, the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court
cannot be deemed to mirror the rights, guarantees and requirements for states under
the EU Directive 2010/64.
It has rightly been acknowledged that defendants who do not speak the language
of the proceedings are ‘especially vulnerable’.151 Simultaneously, cuts in legal aid and
delays in the implementation of states’ obligations under secondary EU law render
access to justice even more challenging for individuals.152 And, of course, the present
global pandemic has raised and will raise new challenges for access to justice across
several areas within the domestic criminal justice system.153 It could also mean that the
right to interpreter should be ensured in online or hybrid hearings, free of charge.154
This article concedes that costs related to interpretation are not negligible.155 Yet, there
can be no trial that is fair if the accused person cannot understand and participate in the
proceedings. This is an essential requirement of the rule of law—both as part of access
to courts, but also as part of the fairness of the proceedings.156
In its jurisprudence on Article 6(3)(e) ECHR, the Strasbourg Court has not relied
on the rule of law; this is different to its approach concerning Article 6(1). This indeed
reflects a broader tendency regarding Article 6(3) ECHR, with few rare exceptions.157
Such reluctance is a shortcoming: not because it would have been necessary to rely
on the rule of law to substantiate violations of guarantees under Article 6, but rather
151 Green Paper (n 25) at 27.
152 See also, in this respect, EU Fundamental Rights Agency and European Court of Human Rights, ‘Handbook
on European law relating to access to justice’ (2016), available at: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Handbook_access_justice_ENG.pdf .
153 See the contributions on access to justice by Fisher Frank, Hansen, Harwood, Lindsey, Tallodi, Nicolson
and Russell in Ferstman and Fagan (eds), Covid-19, Law and Human Rights: Essex Dialogues (2020),
available at: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/28002/1/COVID-19%5ELJ%20LAW%20%5EL0%20HUMA
N%20RIGHTS%20-%20ESSEX%20DIALOGUES%20%201%20July%202020.pdf .
154 OSCE, ‘Fair Trial Rights and Public Health Emergencies’ (2021), available at: www.osce.org/odi
hr/487471, 8.
155 See also, in this respect, Hertog (n 148) 77.
156 Bingham (n 13).
157 One notable exception is the case Poitrimol v France, Application 14,032/88, 23 November 1993, para 38,
where the Court pointed to the ‘the signal importance of the rights of the defence and of the principle of
the rule of law in a democratic society’. The case concerned a violation of Articles 6(1) and 6(3)(c) ECHR.
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because the reliance on the rule of law primarily with regard to Article 6(1) (insofar as
Article 6 is concerned)158 may send a message that the requirements of Article 6(3)
should be granted less prominence and attention.
Evolutive interpretation often appears to have no clearly visible limits; thus, antic-
ipating the next steps in the development of Article 6(3)(e) is a challenging exercise.
Nevertheless, the text of EU Directive 2010/64, which goes in a number of areas
further than the Convention standards, could become a useful reference point for the
Court’s future work. But it is unlikely that its provisions, to the extent that they go
further than the Convention, will be ‘mirrored’ by the Strasbourg jurisprudence any
time soon. There are no signs that the Court will proceed otherwise than cautiously.
And it should not be forgotten, of course, that the corrective function of the Court has
to be complemented with the determination of the Committee of Ministers (a political
organ responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Court’s judgments159) to
push states in the right direction.160
Overall, therefore, unless someone (unlike the present author) is a proponent of
textualism or originalism, there is less room to criticise the Court for its approach and
more room to acknowledge that, with the exception of few unfortunate judgments, it
has progressively developed a jurisprudence that seeks to strengthen a quintessential
guarantee of the criminal process and, accordingly, the defence rights of the accused
person, taking also into account the textual limitations of Article 6(3)(e) ECHR.
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